Phasal Eliminativism, Anti-Lexicalism, and the Status of the Unarticulated by Murphy, Elliot
 
 
 
Biolinguistics 10: 021–050, 2016 
ISSN 1450–3417       http://www.biolinguistics.eu 
Phasal Eliminativism, Anti-Lexicalism,  
and the Status of the Unarticulated  
 
Elliot Murphy 
 
 
This paper explores the prospect that grammatical expressions are propo-
sitionally whole and psychologically plausible, leading to the explanatory 
burden being placed on syntax rather than pragmatic processes, with the 
latter crucially bearing the feature of optionality. When supposedly unarti-
culated constituents are added, expressions which are propositionally dist-
inct, and not simply more specific, arise. The ad hoc nature of a number of 
pragmatic processes carry with them the additional problem of effectively 
acting as barriers to implementing language in the brain. The advantages of 
an anti-lexicalist biolinguistic methodology are discussed, and a bi-phasal 
model of linguistic interpretation is proposed, Phasal Eliminativism, carved 
by syntactic phases and (optionally) enriched by a restricted number of 
pragmatic processes. In addition, it is shown that the syntactic operation of 
labeling (departing from standard Merge-centric evolutionary hypotheses) 
is responsible for a range of semantic and pragmatic phenomena, rendering 
core aspects of syntax and lexical pragmatics commensurable. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The distinction between the uttered and the meant dates back at least to the 4th 
century rhetoricians Servius and Donatus (Horn 2004: 3). More recently, divisions 
between linguistic form and semantic content have been proposed from a 
number of perspectives, invoking unarticulated constituents and ‘completion 
processes’ such as free enrichment to derive and fully specify the supposedly 
underdetermined conceptual representations delivered by syntax (Carston 2007, 
2009, 2012; Fodor 2008). In this paper, the status of unarticulated constituents in 
pragmatics is claimed to have a more much limited role in linguistic inter-
pretation than standardly assumed, and what the computational system delivers 
is shown to be propositionally sufficient and psychologically plausible enough to 
eliminate certain pragmatic operations from the Conceptual-Intentional (CI) 
system (Chomsky 1995, 2014). The problem of biological adequacy is also addres-
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sed in relation to the syntax–pragmatics division of labour, and new directions 
are suggested for how the study of the computational system and pragmatic 
competence can embrace the plurality characteristic of the life sciences. 
 
 
2. Lexicocentrism and the Structure of CI 
 
This first section will present a basic overview of some standard cases discussed 
in the pragmatics literature, setting up the main focus of the paper in section 3, 
which explores how syntax delivers propositionally whole structures and that 
pragmatics can only enrich, and not alter, such structures. It is shown that in 
cases of complex polysemy, nominal reference, and even Case assignment, mean-
ing is determined grammatically, not pragmatically. 
 
2.1. Polysemy 
 
To begin, I will assume that questions of meaning and reference should be ex-
plored at the grammatical, and not purely lexical, level. This ‘internalist’ (Hinzen 
2006, 2007) perspective can be explored through classic pragmatic thought ex-
periments. For instance, if we take Travis’s (1997: 90) sentence “The leaf is green” 
when spoken by either a child or a botanist, the former would be accessing a 
representation from the INTUITIVE BIOLOGY core knowledge system (CKS for 
short; Spelke 2010), while the latter would be using the “science forming faculty” 
(Chomsky 1975).1 We could notate these meanings as LEAFi and LEAFs for intuitive 
concept and (natural) science concept. The meaning of leaf would still be atomic, but 
speakers could employ the respective representations based on appropriateness 
(Ludlow 2014: 132).  
Is there a need, then, to appeal to pragmatic processes in this case? I think 
not. As with complex nominals like book, city, person, appointment, or construction, 
the word leaf can bear the above multiple senses not because it is an indexical 
(shifting its meaning based on context) or because its meanings are coerced or 
because of pragmatic processes, but simply because it is polysemous.2 As Frisson 
(2009) and Vicente (2015) demonstrate, variations in the truth conditions of a 
number of standardly explored utterances like “The leaf is green” or “The book 
was brilliant but weighed a ton” can be systematically explained if we assume 
the existence of semantic operations forming complex types like book(INFOR-
MATION•PHYSICAL_OBJECT) and school(BUILDING•INSTITUTION).3 A similar situ-
                                                
    1 Perhaps a clearer example would be a generic statement like “A leaf is green”, since Travis’s 
case refers to a token leaf (at least, on the most natural reading). 
    2 As Vicente (2015: 54) points out, “[p]olysemy seems to be a relatively neglected phenom-
enon within philosophy of language as well as in many quarters in linguistic semantics. Part 
of this neglect is due to the fact that philosophical and a good part of linguistics semantics 
have been focused on sentential, truth-conditional, meaning, instead of on lexical meaning 
for a long time. But another part has to do with […] the idea that, barring homonymy, each 
word-type has a unique simple denotation”. 
    3 In this case, we need not invoke the observation that green appears to be scalar, being 
licensed if “some contextually specifiable” part of an object is green (Szabó 2001: 137). Note 
that this approach does not exclude the possibility that pragmatic processes can derive 
certain of these stored senses. 
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ation arises in blue ink due to the polysemous status of the noun: When we apply 
the concept BLUE to INK we can do so either by modifying what Pustejovsky 
(1995) terms its ‘formal’ aspect (which defines the ink as a liquid) or its ‘telic’ 
aspect (which defines the ink as a device for writing). This yields the apparent 
flexibility in describing ink as either appearing blue or being able to write in blue. 
The topic of co-predication is particularly relevant here. This is the phe-
nomenon of two apparently incompatible properties being attributed to a single 
object (Murphy 2015b). In (1a), informational and physical predicates apply to 
book, while in (1b) the bill is simultaneously an abstract monetary amount and a 
slip of paper: 
 
(1) a. The book was brilliant but weighed a ton. 
 b.   He paid the bill and threw it away.  
  
Philosophers of language and pragmaticists have typically sidelined the 
importance and intricacy of complex dotted types (Pustejovsky 1995) of the kind 
found in co-predication (see Carston 2012: 616, 2002: 362f., 374f.). Following 
proposals from Gotham (2012, 2015) and Bosch (2007), treating the meaning of 
nominals like book and city as reflections of conceptual, and not lexical semantic, 
complexity, allows us to deal with apparent paradoxes which force the multi-
plication of semantic senses. Consequently, novel simultaneously possesses ab-
stract and concrete conceptual features, a form of productivity which allows it to 
extend its meaning from a material text to a piece of electronic information on a 
memory stick, and beyond, licensing different CI representations: (i) ∀x (BOOK1(x) 
 PRINTED TEXT(x)…), (ii) ∀x (BOOK2(x)  INFORMATION(x)…).4 It follows that our 
knowledge of novels being prose “is not lexical knowledge, but literary theory” 
(Bosch 2014: 45, emphasis his). The NOVEL concepts seen in co-predication are 
what Bosch terms “contextual”/unsaturated concepts which are enriched by sub-
categorization and predication information, along with discourse data. This 
allows us to relocate polysemy—including the verbal-nominal cases of cut and 
stop discussed by Searle (1980) and Rayo (2013)—to the CI-system.5 These results 
                                                
    4 Co-predication appears to have a number of grammatical and semantic constraints which 
have not been noticed in the literature (including Gotham 2015 and Chomsky 2000), which 
remain to be accounted for in model-theoretic or syntactic terms and which suggest that the 
qualia and argument structure relations of words like book and newspaper are much more 
intricate than Pustejovsky originally assumed. Dot-type nominals like translation can refer to 
a process or a physical text, but while (i) is well-formed, (ii), which reverses the sense order, 
is not. While the physical and informational senses of newspaper can appear together, as in 
(iii), adding the institutional sense leads to a licensing failure in (iv)—but not when placed 
in a modificational structure, as in (v), and (vi) even points to the existence of three-way co-
predication (see Murphy 2015b for discussion):  
          (i)     The translation that lies on the table was difficult. 
          (ii)  ?The translation was difficult and lies on the table. 
          (iii)   John held the reactionary and large newspaper. 
          (iv) *That newspaper is owned by a trust and is covered with coffee. 
          (v)    The most provocative newspaper of the year has been sued by the government. 
          (vi)   The well-written newspaper that I held this morning has been sued by the government.  
    5 Lexical ambiguity and polysemy may partly result from the fact that “the human brain is 
limited in the number of signs that it can store and quickly retrieve. This number is 
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also depart from Fodor’s (2008) view that words express Fregean ‘senses’, or 
modes of presentation (MOPs), being representations of some mind-external 
entity ‘out there’, invoking an indefensible mind-world dualism (see Collins 2015 
for related discussion).6 
There have been attempts, however, to explain co-predication on pragmatic 
grounds, which I think can be shown to be empirically inadequate. For instance, 
Brandtner (2009) proposes that the co-predication yielded by German deverbal    
–ung nominalization cannot be addressed by compositional operations alone, but 
additionally require pragmatic processes. In the case of Übersetzung ‘translation’, 
the selectional restrictions of two conflicting interpretations simultaneously ap-
ply to one token of the nominal, where ‘tedious’ and ‘easy’ refer both to the act of 
translation and more difficult translations are assumed to have a higher ‘pay-off’ 
(an event, EV, and result, RE): 
 
(2) German 
Die [langwierige]EV Übersetzung [verkaufte sich millionenfach]RE. 
the    tedious                translation       sold           itself million-fold 
‘The tedious translation sold million-fold.’ 
 
Certain cases bar co-predication licensing, as in (3): 
 
(3) German 
?Die [einfache]EV Übersetzung [verkaufte sich millionenfach]RE. 
  the    easy               translation       sold          itself million-fold 
‘The easy translation sold million-fold.’ 
 
If co-predication with event and result readings is only possible if there is a 
salient relation between the two, then co-predication, Brandtner argues, cannot 
be reduced to semantic principles. He points to ‘general ontological constraints’ 
on type combinations, such that we cannot conceive of a firm’s management as 
being simultaneously an event (an act of managing) and an agent (a manager), 
even though management can independently be either an individual (or individu-
als) and an event (where AG denotes AGENT): 
 
(4) German 
          ??Die Leitung der Anwaltskanzlei ist [schwierig]EV und hat [angerufen]AG. 
              the  management the.GEN law-firm is  difficult            and has   called 
          ‘The management of the law firm is difficult and has called.’ 
 
                                                                                                                                 
relatively small compared to the extremely vast number of situations we may encounter and 
ideas we can entertain about them” (Bouchard 2013: 49). 
    6 Contrary to Russell, Kripke, and Putnam’s semantic externalism, Franz Brentano thought 
that the default mode of human cognition centered on thoughts about non-existent things, 
and that thoughts about existent things are ‘secondary’. Co-predication and related studies 
in semantic internalism (Pietroski 2012, forthcoming) appear to support this (admittedly 
vague) position that we initially think about non-existent things as if they existed; books and 
cities are thought about ‘as if’ they were existent entities, but in fact are not. 
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With derived nominals, event and object readings can be licensed if a 
causal or salient reading obtains, as in (2), with the difficult translation paying off 
with higher sales. But in ‘The easy translation sold million-fold’, Brandtner 
claims that since expectations (of easy translations selling poorly) have not been, 
the unexpected reading must be licensed by local discourse markers, as in the 
case in which an easy translation is made known to nevertheless sell well: 
 
(5) German 
Die einfache Übersetzung verkaufte sich dennoch millionenfach. 
the  easy         translation       sold          itself still          million-fold  
‘The easy translation still sold million fold.’ 
 
But we do not need to say that pragmatic processes ‘save’ the co-predication 
interpretation from crashing, since ‘The easy translation sold million fold’ is se-
mantically unexpected but still able to constitute a complex type. Co-predication 
is licensed in the same way it is in unexpected cases like ‘The brilliant newspaper 
I held this morning has been sued’. Even if Brandtner’s pragmatics-based theory 
was accurate, we would only need to invoke world knowledge to yield the sup-
posedly poor judgment in (3), and the processes of pragmatics and dot-type gen-
eration need not interact or influence each other.7  
 
2.2. The Philosophy of Case 
 
While the word-world relation is gradually being severed through the work of 
such semantic internalism, or ‘I-Semantics’ (Pietroski 2005, Hinzen 2007), the 
word–concept relation, used to defend the existence of pragmatic unarticulated 
constituents, remains strong and well accepted—for dubious reasons. Nouns, for 
instance, “need not denote objects either when they are used as predicates or 
parts of predicates” (Hinzen & Sheehan 2013: 73). For instance, ‘This is the 
building’ is referential when asserted, but when functioning as an argument 
(‘believed [this is the building]’) it is a predicate to a mental event. It may be 
possible to go so far as to argue that propositional forms of reference are not 
‘semantic’ or ‘pragmatic’ but are rather grammar-dependent, relying on relations 
typically designated as structural cases (nominative and accusative). For instance, 
by showing that such Case cannot be reduced to thematic structure, Person, 
Tense, or Agreement, Hinzen (2014) argues that Case can receive a rationalization 
through its role of marking cross-phasal word movement, rather than simply 
reflecting formal licensing constraints on nominal arguments. Case has also been 
assigned no philosophical significance (troubling no theorists of denotation or 
reference), and is seen as a peculiar, even quirky ‘syntactic’ feature of gramma-
tical structure. Since language is often thought of as merely a mode of expressing 
thought, and not organizing it, Case has unsurprisingly been sidelined. But if it 
                                                
    7 The complex polysemy seen in co-predication also seems to explain why Chomsky’s (2000) 
London can be demolished and rebuilt elsewhere, and why Pietroski’s (2005) France can 
simultaneously be both hexagonal and a republic. Additionally, I think much of the ‘lexical 
underdeterminacy’ discussed in Ludlow (2014) can be accounted for when explored 
through accounts of polysemy. 
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can be shown that Case licenses referential arguments and that no other gram-
matical device can do this, Case would be given a meaningful role in linguistic 
cognition, sidelining the need for extra-syntactic pragmatic accounts.8 
As a way of approaching this possibility, we can begin by noting that 
lexically organized meaning is distinct from syntactically configured meaning: 
Despite its internal featural complex, lacking any subjects, predicates, modifiers, 
definiteness, or assertions, an individual word like lion can never refer to a parti-
cular lion, some lions, lion-meat, lion-like characteristics, or lions more generally. 
Since lion is a lexical item and the lion is not, and only the latter can refer to a lion, 
then reference consequently lies on the side of grammatical organization. Since 
the carries no substantive lexical content, it also cannot be maintained that refer-
ence arises from a somewhat more complex lexical level; even the lion will only 
become referential when occuring in a suitable grammatical structure. The lion 
ran is referential, for instance, but I wish to be the lion, in the case of a stage pro-
duction, is not. In addition, referentiality can arise from other structures like Gold 
is yellow, in which a common noun becomes referential, possible through N-to-D 
movement (see Longobardi 2005; Murphy 2014a). 
Further, the KP/nominal ‘phase’ (Chomsky 2008, Gallego 2012) appears to 
be mapped to objects, the vP/verbal phase to events, and the CP/clausal phase to 
propositions, with a containment relation existing from the highest to the lowest 
phase (hence events necessarily contain objects): 
 
(6) Phasal Hierarchy 
 [CP … [vP … [KP … ]]] 
 
These formal distinctions (objects, events, propositions) co-vary with 
grammar, not other systems like beliefs or intentions. There are no clauses that 
are object-referential in the way proper names are, verb phrases or non-finite 
clauses can denote events but not full propositions with truth-values, and 
nominals cannot do so either. Referential objects are consequently ordered in a 
hierarchical fashion, in part–whole terms (events include states, which in turn 
include objects and their substances), with a core function of grammar appearing 
to be the regulation of reference.9 
A notion of referential strength also seems to mirror this hierarchy. The KP 
argument [KP K [NP lions]] in I like lions is an argument, but the phase edge is 
empty, lacking a determiner. As a result, reference is only to lions in general, and 
not to any particular lion(s). Reference to an amount of lion (as a substance) 
requires reducing this structure even more, removing Number marking: I had lion 
                                                
    8 As Hinzen (2014: 138) puts it: “If grammar is meaningful, and in a different sense of ‘mean-
ing’ than we find in the lexicon, then grammatical relations matter as an independent input 
to semantic interpretation, in a way that Agree or Merge, as abstractions from such mean-
ingful relations, do not.” 
    9  This mereological, hierarchical organization lends support to the characterization of the CP, 
vP, and KP phases in Murphy (2014a) as, respectively, the Russellian phase (co-varying with 
propositions), the Davidsonian phase (co-varying with events, defined as such regardless of 
physical or temporal features—atomic decay qualifies as an event just as much as cosmic 
expansion or football game), and the Fregean phase (co-varying with objects and their sub-
stances). 
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(i.e. I ate lion). When a determiner appears, individual reference is licensed: I had 
a lion. Definiteness is also licensed in this configuration, but only when the deter-
miner is strong, e.g. the (as in I had the lion). Individual deictic reference requires a 
deictic morpheme (I had that lion), and the NP itself is no longer required (I had 
that/this). Finally, with the presence of singular personal deictics, this restriction 
on NP dropping is no longer optional, but obligatory (*I man).10 This leads to a hi-
erarchy ranging from predicative to non-specific to indefinite-specific to definite-
specific to deictic to personal (of the kind Zamparelli 2000 called for):11 
 
(7) Nominal Phase Referential Hierarchy 
 *(NP) < *(the) *(NP) < *(this) (NP) < *I/you (*NP) 
 
Grammatical hierarchies also arise with events (which progress from states 
to full events) and propositions (progressing from non-finite to finite CPs). Only 
syntactic theory, and not model-theoretic semantics, can offer an explanation for 
the emergence of such ontologies, and not just a formal characterization of them. 
The generation of these hierarchies crucially relies on relations morphologically 
interpreted as Cases: “In the absence of argument-positions, which do not exist in 
Minimalist grammar, Case is the only thing that yields argument relations: them-
atic roles, in particular, exist in the adjunct system, and require no arguments” 
(Hinzen 2014: 140).12 
Assuming that all arguments are introduced by functional heads (indirect 
objects via an applicative head, agentive or active subjects via a Voice head, and 
direct objects in the edge of v), this leads to the following schema, which can 
reveal how particular argument relations are morphologically realized: [Voice … 
NP3 … [Appl … NP2 … [v–V … NP1]]] (see Kratzer 1996). As noted in Hinzen & 
Sheehan (2013) and Hinzen (2014), a formal ontology is produced alongside this 
licensing, with NP1 being licensed in relation to v yielding an event or state, 
Voice yielding more complex events containing the previous event/state, and all 
of which is morphologically interpreted in terms of Case-marking. Different 
Voice-v heads generate distinct Case-marking patterns, something which co-
varies with the hierarchy of meaning: 
                                                
    10  These observations suggest that the term ‘definite description’ is misleading, since whether 
or not a phrase like the lion is used as a definite description is determined by its syntactic 
context. 
    11  Similar considerations lead Martin & Hinzen (2014: 102) to propose a Grammar-Reference 
Link Hypothesis: “Referential strength (from predicativity to deixis) is not an intrinsic 
property of lexical items, but rather of certain grammatical configurations.” 
    12  It remains to be stressed that, contrary to the statements in Hinzen & Sheehan (2013) and 
Hinzen (2014), grammar itself does not refer, but rather people use grammar to refer in a 
given circumstance. Words like chair and table do not ‘refer’ to anything, but when used by a 
speaker (with intentions) they can potentially refer, given the phasal configurations provid-
ed by grammar. Syntax itself is not enough for reference to be established, any more than a 
functioning olfactory system is enough for someone to smell (the notion of will needs to 
enter, too). The referential capacities of non-human primates should also not be underesti-
mated (see Murphy 2015c), with Hinzen & Sheehan summarily dismissing primate cogniti-
on for supposedly not rising to the level of ‘thought’ (a term they mystically associate only 
with grammatical cognition, misleadingly and unhelpfully). Reference cannot be solely re-
duced to grammatical factors, then, and questions remain about how speaker intention 
interfaces with syntax, to be explored in section 3. 
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(8) a. We [VoiceACT-v killed himACC] 
 b. Henom [Voicepas-v was killed]   
 c.  Henom [Voiceunacc-v died] 
 
Case morphology consequently appears to track cross-phasal relations; 
when a nominal crosses a phase boundary, its Case marking changes, despite the 
fact that, for instance, in (8a) and (8b) him and he have identical thematic roles. In 
(8a), ACC expresses a relation between the verb and internal argument, yielding a 
predicate with no truth-value (killed him cannot be assessed for truth). But in (8b), 
NOM expresses a relation between the finite verb and external argument, corres-
ponding to a proposition.13 Movement for reasons of Case is therefore inter-
pretable, contrary to standard minimalist assumptions (Chomsky 2001).14 
There is also no need to invoke deflationary theories of truth (Horwich 1998) 
according to which to assert that a statement is true is just to assert the statement 
itself, since grammar delivers the structure which the interpretive systems 
proceed to substantiate (see Martin & Hinzen 2014 and section 3 for examples). 
Moreover, the criterion of individuation is heavily influenced by grammar, and is 
not just an amorphous series of ‘sortal concepts’ as invoked by Galery (2009). 
This phasal theory of reference also resolves certain debates in contemporary 
Millianism (Mousavian 2015), since the strength with which it is possible to refer 
using some nominal expression is modulated by how ‘high’ up the phasal hierar-
chy an object moves, while existence is shown not to be encoded in the grammar 
(unlike features such as Tense). While we cannot explore the formal ontological 
structure of the world through physical experimentation or perceptual analysis, 
linguistic theory provides a way (indeed, perhaps the only way) of doing so.  
With a phasal syntax, then, concepts like proposition and event co-vary with 
the grammatical architecture itself (de Villiers 2014)—that is, its computational 
and its base of declarative knowledge as opposed to the system processing 
speech acts—and it is needless to postulate Mentalese or a language of thought (à 
la Fodor 1998) or pragmatic processes, even if mediation of such syntactic and se-
mantic structures is not identical to reduction, since an understanding of CI bare 
output conditions and of conceptual representations (through developmental 
psychology, philosophy of language, and other domains) is, under core mini-
malist assumptions, all that is needed. The importance of developing syntactic 
analyses becomes clearer when we acknowledge with Narita (2014: 10) that there 
is no direct evidence for the nature of CI, and we can access its effects only via 
“speculations, introspections or theory-internal considerations”.15  
 
                                                
    13  This leads to a possible solution to the perennial problem surrounding why Case is 
category-sensitive, being primarily assigned to nominals, since it may be that Case is rather 
sensitive to referentiality, which happens to be related to nominals (but which cannot be 
reduced to the category Noun). 
    14  Knott’s (2014) model of Case also attributes a semantic role to it, but from the perspective of 
a particular hypothesis concerning the sensorimotor–LF interface. 
    15  More worryingly, since the human scientific faculty is, like all organic faculties, limited and 
constrained—being composed of concepts such as probability, determinacy, and input–out-
put schemas—the conceptual tools available to linguists may be insufficient to explain core 
(and very simple) aspects of CI.  
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2.2. Lexical Semantics 
 
Since I have argued against any substantial role for pragmatic processes in 
complex polysemy and nominal reference, I would like to propose two phases of 
linguistic interpretation: syntactic computation and pragmatic computation. In order 
to properly address the debates surrounding unarticulated constituents, I will 
situate the discussion in section 3 within a clear architectural framework, which 
requires elaboration.  
I will assume that the inputs to syntax are flat or atomic ‘lexical precursor 
cells’ (LPCs; Boeckx 2014: 27) which acquire their lexical features as the deri-
vation proceeds and phases are transferred to the interfaces (Munakata 2009). 
Call the set of LPCs the Precursor Lexicon, pLEX for short (as in Murphy 2015a). 
What lexical features contribute is a unique configuring of other mental systems, 
providing instructions to them (Chomsky 2012: 191). This idea seems to be 
supported by the finding that verbal labels influence categorization in infants 
(Plunkett et al. 2008). Questions remain over how the nature of lexical items came 
about, but, as argued below, a significant step in the right direction is made when 
we detach syntactic computation from lexical influence.16 The work of Borer 
(2005), Boeckx (2014), and others suggests that forms of grammatical order arise 
not from the lexicon but from the dynamics of the derivation.17 In sharp contrast 
to this, it is possible to detect notable similarities between lexicocentrism, geno-
centrism, and neo-phrenology, all of which seek explanations based on element-
ary components rather than deriving structure from processes or forms. But un-
like lexicocentrism, the latter two have been surpassed over the last half century 
by evo-devo agendas, systems neuroscience, and other ‘formalist’ (Amundson 
1998; Hinzen 2006) and dynamic approaches. 
In addition to the above model of reference, I think there are other reasons 
not to rely on pragmatic accounts of natural language meaning. For instance, 
there is a near-optimal match between phasal derivations and Neo-Davidsonian 
event representations (Kratzer 2003), with Boeckx (2014: 103) arguing for a caus-
ality between the emergence of phases and the evolution of complex event con-
cepts. C maps to the point of existential closure, v to internal/external thematic 
role assignment, and n to type-lifting turning a predicate into an argument, and p 
                                                
    16 This is a change which is already steadily developing in labeling theory and recent discus-
sions centered on how Merge is no longer seen to be ‘driven’ by, for instance, feature 
valuation and θ-role assignment; see Epstein et al. (2015), but also Wurmbrand’s (2014) 
valuation-based Merge Condition and Bošković’s (2008) observation that feature checking 
has a freezing effect on movement, which would be difficult to capture in a ‘free Merge’ 
architecture.  
    17  In this sense, but not others (for instance, see Boeckx 2015), this anti-lexicalist stance is com-
patible with the present reference-centered rationality of Case, in which it is grammatical 
organization which gives rise to propositional reference, and not Case-features rendering 
Goals active to Agree with Probes—a move which reduces grammatical relations to 
features; an example of what Boeckx would term ‘featuritis’, with features in contemporary 
minimalism often being deployed simply to ‘capture the facts’, being all-powerful in a 
similar way transformations and parameters were in the 1960s and 1980s. The explanatory 
power of feature-driven theories is far from awe-inspiring: Nouns are defined as belonging 
to the category [+Noun], and so on; similar to how Fodor “often seems satisfied to explain a 
concept by typing the word for it in different cases and fonts” (Pinker 2008: 97), with dog 
denoting the concept DOG and subprime mortgage denoting the concept MORTGAGE(SUB-PRIME). 
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to adjunct introduction. Although these correspondences are admittedly cursory, 
it nevertheless appears that Collins and many others are likely incorrect in 
claiming that “syntax fails to match up with content in a principled way” (Collins 
2007: 806).  
These observations support Borer’s (2005) exoskeletal morphological model 
which views open-class words as hidden ‘conceptual packages’ that are purely 
embedded in the syntactic structure, causing no alteration to it or itself. Only 
when the structure is built by phase is the package ‘opened’ (interpreted). This is 
one of many reasons why syntax appears to be entirely free of lexical influence, 
operating independently of the needs of feature matrices (see Epstein et al. 2014 
on ‘free’ Simplest Merge). As discussed in Murphy (2015d), many linguistic 
modules constructed during the Government and Binding era live on re-cast as 
features, yielding a form of massive modularity as a historical residue.18 Invoking 
Merge and roots (Marantz 1997; Borer 2014), though necessary, also fails to 
illuminate the structure of the objects Merge ultimately operates on, leaving 
unaddressed the question of how feature-bundles are constructed to begin with 
(for a proposed mechanism of feature-set binding based on neural oscillations, 
see Murphy 2015e, forthcoming; Murphy & Benítez-Burraco 2016).19 This kind of 
lexicocentrism is simultaneously a barrier to developing linking hypotheses bet-
ween linguistics and neuroscience, since it presupposes that syntax only operates 
on something as narrowly domain-specific as a lexicon. Instead, we can assume 
that LPCs are enriched by a small set of featural representations as the derivation 
proceeds, such as obligatory A-features (φ-features) and optional A’-features 
(Wh, Top, Rel, and so forth), as they are termed in van Urk (2015). 
This modular perspective opens up new avenues for interpretation. The 
concept BOTTLE, for instance, relies on visual cognition through its shape and 
colour features, with language contributing its functional properties (container, 
used to move material masses, and so forth; McGilvray 2005: 308). Similarly, a 
pile of leaves in a forest becomes a thing if it is put there intentionally, perhaps to 
act as a signal, where thinghood should be distinguished from the objecthood of 
visual perception (the point being that the functional criteria of language is not 
strictly aligned with the structural criteria of the visual system: Language seems 
to deliver to objects a functional role). If the mind is composed of CKSs (Spelke 
2010), then language may allow a child to use pre-lexical concepts, which may 
not be systematically combinable, ‘to introduce Lexical Concepts’, which—via set-
formation/Conjoin—can be combined (Pietroski 2014a). Exploring these issues 
further, Pietroski (2012) has claimed that the lexicalization of concepts is a nece-
ssarily creative process which cannot be reduced to instances of words ‘labeling’ 
or ‘standing for’ particular concepts, with his theory of semantic computation 
reducing to Conjoin and a limited form of existential closure.20 This seems to sup-
                                                
    18  Thus Lakoff (1972: ii): “So linguists fudge, just as has been done in the reflexive rule, by 
sticking on the arbitrary feature +REFL. Such a feature is a fudge. It might as well be called 
+CHOCOLATE, which would in fact be a better name, since it would clearly reveal the 
nature of the fudge.”  
    19  See Svenonius (2012) for a proposed ‘Bundle’ operation, and Murphy (2015a) for an alternat-
ive based on set-formation/Simplest Merge. 
    20  When the brain acquired the ability to lexicalize concepts (see Murphy 2015e for a neurobio-
logical proposal for how this was achieved), it created “items that could be freely called up, 
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port the notion that words are not concepts but rather instructions to build concepts 
(from their semantic features) (Pietroski 2014a, forthcoming). Given this back-
ground, it remains to be seen how the syntactic and pragmatic components oper-
ate to derive conceptual structures. This topic will be the concern of section 3. 
 
 
3. Unarticulated Constituents and the Syntax-Semantics Interface 
 
While much is known about the computational operations of syntax (Adger 2003; 
Narita 2014), the computations of the pragmatics module(s) stand on less firm 
ground. One such proposed computation is saturation, a ‘completion process’ 
(Bach 1994: 133; Carston 2009: 15) operating on constructions like “Paracetamol is 
better [than x]”.21 Saturation has been argued by Stanley & Szabó (2000), in their 
syntactically-motivated rejection of much of the pragmatics architecture, to be the 
only active pragmatic computation. For others, such as Hall (2008), there are pro-
cesses such as free enrichment, a lexical process modifying subparts of CI repre-
sentations: “It’s snowing [in location x]” (Sperber & Wilson 1995; Recanati 2004). 
These are cases of ‘unarticulated constituents’ (Recanati 2002), differing from 
those proposed in theories of syntactic ellipsis in that they are motivated on prag-
matic grounds. Finally, computations involving lexical pragmatics (Wilson & Cars-
ton 2007, Sperber & Wilson 2015) adjust or modulate existing elements of lingu-
istic meaning, as in the case where “David is a man” is interpreted as meaning 
David is an ideal man. 
 
3.1. Phasal Eliminativism 
  
This section will argue that most of these operations can be eliminated in favor of 
more principled grammatical accounts. As an alternative, the following model 
will be defended:  
 
(9) Phasal Eliminativism 
 Syntax supplies instructions to CI to construct conceptual representations 
which can optionally be pragmatically enriched.  
 
Phasal Eliminativism is a form of eliminativism not because it denies word 
meanings, but rather because it denies the existence of core components of the 
                                                                                                                                 
partially independent of perception” (Hinzen & Sheehan 2013: 38). Boeckx (2014: 109) 
speculates that it may turn out that “some of the properties of human concepts can be 
derived from the fact that they have been lexicalized”. 
    21  Saturation is seen as a central pragmatic process under Wrong Format (WF) theories. 
Recanati (2004) defines this as the view that linguistic semantics does not yield a truth-
conditional component, but there is nonetheless context-independent meaning associated 
with a word. WF holds that words have meanings, albeit ones which are too semantically 
rich to be employed in utterance interpretation. On the more extreme end of the spectrum, 
Meaning Eliminativism (ME) is the most radical form of contextualism (Bezuidenhout 2002), 
or the view that sentences express content only given a particular speech act context, which 
triggers relevant memory traces (Hintzman 1986) from a ‘grab bag’ of maps and images 
(Rayo 2013), along with other top-down processes (Rumelhart 1993: 78). ME is WF “pushed 
to the extremes” (Recanati 2004: 141), denying word meaning at the type level and embrac-
ing only contextual tokens. 
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pragmatics system. It should be stressed, however, that while pragmatic pro-
cesses can enrich syntactic structures (hence the ‘optional’ status), such structures 
are not as radically underspecified for conceptual content as is typically claimed 
in the pragmatics literature. As a way of explanation, unarticulated constituents 
are usually deemed part of presupposed discourse knowledge. They are taken to 
be propositional elements which do not arise at the sensorimotor interface (SM) 
but are necessary for a sentence to become truth-evaluable, occuring as part of 
the top-down free enrichment process.22 The status of such constituents remains a 
major topic of research. To take a few simple examples, McIntosh (2014) claims 
that “It is raining in London” really expresses the proposition “It is raining in 
London now”, while Fodor (2001: 12) argues that “It’s three o’clock” really repre-
sents “It’s three o’clock here and now, in the afternoon” (or whenever the sen-
tence is spoken). These cases suggest a degree of misalignment between external-
ization and thought. Debates in lexical pragmatics often then center on the 
question of whether one should expand the influence of Logical Form (Chomsky 
1995) or pragmatic processes of free enrichment to account for such misalign-
ment. Departing from this focus and putting the explanatory burden on syntax, 
Hinzen (2015) argues that there is nothing ‘missing’ in grammatical constructions 
for them to encode propositionality. When the supposed unarticulated expres-
sions are inserted, completely different propositions result, rather than a simply 
more ‘overt’ or ‘specific’ form of the underlying proposition usually posited. The 
only hidden constituents are the ones syntactically motivated in theories of 
movement, control, and so on, which are interpreted at CI but not externalized at 
SM.23 Focusing on free enrichment, a cross-linguistic exploration of pragmatic 
processes led Martí (2015) to suggest that most cases typically used to defend free 
enrichment processes can be explained through the involvement of grammatical 
processes. In addition, the present section will show that only lexically and not 
grammatically specified aspects of meaning are altered by context: The principles 
of theta-role assignment and agreement relations are unswayed by how much 
rain is pouring in London. There may consequently exist cases of what could be 
called ‘lexical underdeterminacy’, but not at the level of phrase structure 
building. I will also argue, following numerous others, that Logical Form can be 
dispensed with, and that syntactic structures are mediated purely through 
pragmatic processes (extra-grammatical in nature, such as world knowledge), as 
Phasal Eliminativism suggests.  
The cases typically explored in defence of pragmatic unarticulated 
constituents crucially involve a level of optionality; that is, the enriched meaning 
is not necessarily tied to the expression, as in “Every time John lights a cigarette, 
it rains” (Stanley 2000), which can introduce a location variable (“…rains in the 
place he lights the cigarette”), but does not have to.24 Confusing optional for obli-
                                                
    22  For the seminal proposal, see Perry’s ‘Thought without Representation’ (1993: 206). 
    23  The centrality of CI in linguistic structure, a core minimalist assumption, was arguably 
appreciated by ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ philosopher Johann Hamann: “To speak is to trans-
late—from a language of angels into a language of men” (Rudd 1994: 197). See Strawson 
(2008) and Murphy (2014b) for related classical references. 
    24  This perspective aligns with Chomsky’s claim that pragmatics, although being the “waste-
bin” (2006: 98) of linguistics into which inexplicable puzzles are cast, equates to “principles 
of action” and comprehension, not structure-building (Andor 2015: 148). 
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gatory processes, perhaps the defining characteristics of contemporary prag-
matics, would be deemed a thorough methodological catastrophe in any other 
scientific domain. It can further be shown that grammar systematically deter-
mines, and not merely constrains, the proposition expressed in cases of supposed 
misalignment between meaning and syntax. For instance, all too often are 
possible logical deductions about expressions taken to be ‘implicatures’, when in 
fact the content of implicatures derived from a single expression are not only 
propositionally distinct, but contextually distinct, encoding dissimilar thoughts 
and being appropriate under different circumstances. To illustrate, the 
implicature standardly derived from “John has four cars” is “John has exactly 
four cars,” despite the latter construction being propositionally and circumstanti-
ally distinct from the former. Following Phasal Eliminativism, assume that 
semantic interpretations are built via cyclically transferred labeled structures and 
the operations of the pragmatic/interpretative faculties. Pragmatics can enrich 
but not conflict with the output of the grammatical Merge–Agree–Label–Transfer 
process. What’s more, to revert the standard metaphysical assumptions of lexical 
pragmatics, phases also determine what constitutes a context by constraining how 
a situation can impact the referential uses of expressions. Contexts are not pre-
existing, mind-independent states of affairs in the world, but rather amount to 
different ways in which grammar can orient its delivery of conceptual content 
around experience, which determines (at most) perceptual schemas and prefer-
ences for particular representational retrievals. In short, contexts are nothing 
more than mental states, and syntactic structures denote updates of these states. 
There is no a priori reason why some independently defined ‘context’ should 
influence the operations of syntax and CI. The present proposal consequently 
departs from Wilson’s (2014: 144) belief that a “linguistic expression” is inter-
preted by being “put in systematic correspondence with states of the world.” The 
pragmatics literature rarely unpacks what is meant by “linguistic expression” or 
“states of the world”, and with words like book and city being shown to have no 
mind-independent referent (Murphy 2015b), the referentialist perspective Wilson 
adopts becomes unmotivated.  
With syntax ultimately being responsible for numerous interpretive pheno-
mena, this leads to a similar situation that Strawson (2015) is left in after discus-
sing the philosophical distinction between internal and external content:  
 
The domain of external content has traditionally been taken to be the 
external world of tables and chairs. It’s a vast domain, even when we restrict 
ourselves to concrete reality and put aside things like numbers and concepts. 
I’ve argued that the domain of external content is larger still. It extends 
further into the mind than is sometimes supposed. It’s only at a very late 
stage, as we travel into the mind from its traditional heartland—the ‘external 
environment’ as it is usually understood—that we reach its true border. And 
the metaphor of the border is misleading. The internal content-external con-
tent boundary isn’t a straightforward ontological line, because we can think 
consciously about everything that exists, and everything we can think about 
can be external content, and is external content when we think about it. 
 
While it is true that lexical features determine conceptual content, what has 
not been acknowledged by the pragmatics literature is that reference is deter
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mined by the grammar, not the lexicon, as noted in section 2. Lexical specifi-
cations are thoroughly context-sensitive, but grammar is not. Both the pLEX and 
the computational system contribute to meaning, but meaning of a different sort. 
Consider the examples below: 
 
(10) a. The colonel wanted to be [a man].  
 b.  [A man] was seen by the butcher. 
 
In (10a), ‘a man’ is used predicatively to denote a property the colonel 
wishes to satisfy, whereas in (10b) the phrase is used referentially. It can also be 
used generically, as in ‘A man would be wise to avoid that river’, and the uses of 
the phrase ‘a man’ are purely determined by the grammar, not lexical content. 
That is, it is determined by the phasal position, with movement to the phase edge 
—such as in N-to-D movement—yielding stronger referentiality.25 The crucial 
factor in determining referentiality is not lexical category (N or D), but rather 
phasal position, so a more adequate term for this would be Interior-to-Edge 
movement, where [edge[interior]] is the phasal template, and under which 
descriptive content is found in the Interior (e.g. predicative interpretations like    
‘I saw [E [I lamb]]’ describing the kind of meat witnessed) and referentiality is 
established at the Edge (e.g. referential interpretations like ‘I saw [E the [I man]]’ 
or rigid 3rd Person interpretations like ‘I saw [E Mary [I t]]’, where Interior-to-Edge 
movement has taken place). A given name’s semantic type reflects its phasal 
position, then, and so claiming (and is standardly done) that names enter the 
derivation as type <e> is an inaccurate generalization.  
These observations are compatible with the ethological literature (Murphy 
2015a, 2015c), which reveals that non-human forms of externalization are most 
likely limited to ‘functional reference’, and not the elaborate forms of reference 
made available through the labeling-driven syntactic component. The lexicon 
(however one formulates it) and syntax play entirely different roles in the con-
struction of interpretations, as cases of specific language impairments and forms 
of mental disorders appear to illustrate (Hinzen & Sheehan 2013). The compu-
tational system therefore allows for a systematic and well-grounded investi-
gation into the nature of meaning, escaping the kind of ad hoc adventurism of 
many philosophical and semantic theories parodied by Lycan (1984: 272) in his 
Double Indexical Theory of Meaning: 
 
(11) MEANING=def Whatever aspect of linguistic activity happens to interest me now. 
 
Another major issue I would like to raise with the lexical pragmaticist’s 
reliance on enrichment is that it dodges the more fundamental problem of 
accounting for the internal complexities of individual lexical items and phrases. 
                                                
    25  In a related discussion, Hinzen (2014: 140-141) writes: “We only know whether a given 
lexical item functions referentially or predicatively by looking at its grammaticalization, and 
the question of whether proper names are predicates or referential is ill formed. It wouldn’t 
make sense to class a word like ‘Mary’ lexically through a feature like REF (for ‘referential’); 
or to specify a given nominal as ‘ARG’ (for ‘argument’); or to class it as ‘ACC’ and define a 
derivation through the need to ‘check’ such a feature.” Again, the prospects for feature-
driven theories of meaning are bleak. 
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The logic appears to be as follows: Explain the mysteries of lexical items and their 
complex conceptual interface properties by invoking further lexical items with 
their complex conceptual interface properties.  
Going somewhat beyond Hinzen’s (2015) and Hinzen & Sheehan’s (2013) 
analysis, I would like to propose that it is not just grammar that mediates 
conceptual content like propositionality and objecthood, but more specifically 
grammatical sub-operations.26 Set-formation (in its various guises in the 
literature) is responsible for forming adjuncts, which crucially do not influence 
the grammaticality (i.e. phrasal/labeled/headed status) or truth-values of the 
construction they adjoin to. The truth of “It is 6 o’clock” is not affected by adding 
the PP ‘in the afternoon’. The common claim in lexical pragmatics and lexical 
semantics that the PP is somehow ‘hidden’—indeed, ‘obligatorily hidden’—does 
not square with the well-established influences of the computational system on 
sentence meaning (Pietroski forthcoming; Hornstein & Pietroski 2009). To illus-
trate further, consider the following: 
 
(12) a. It’s three o’clock. 
 b.   It’s three o’clock now. 
 
Even though (12a) means, in virtue of its fully specified tense, “It is three 
o’clock now”, we cannot suitably answer the question “When is it three o’clock?” 
by saying “It’s three o’clock”; instead, we have to say “It’s three o’clock now”. 
Again, the adjunct is not ‘hidden’, and a different CI representation arises in the 
absence and presence of the adjunct (contra McIntosh 2014: 97 and his focus on 
Dummettian ‘ingredient senses’ and statements being true “just in case” certain 
conditions obtain). Adding now only serves to distort the meaning of the sentence 
in particular circumstances: (12b) can be corrected with (13), but (12a) cannot (in 
a case in which it’s three o’clock when (13) is being spoken): 
 
(13) No, it’s three o’clock then. 
  
The supposedly hidden constituents posited by Fodor (2001) and others do 
not in fact yield a ‘more accurate’ structure, but simply a propositionally and 
psychologically distinct representation.27 Among other theories, this weighs 
against McIntosh’s (2014) revival of Evans’s (1985) proposal that the truth-value 
of propositions can vary over time. The grammar of a proposition is an object in-
dependent of its truth-value, though one which crucially directs its construction. 
Syntax builds sentences through procedures which are unrelated to truth, 
contrary to a number of claims in the philosophical literature (see Pietroski 2014b 
for discussion). Truth is an epiphenomenon of syntax requiring various kinds of 
                                                
    26  This proposal should be understood in the context of the Decompositionalist Project out-
lined in Murphy (2015c), which seeks to achieve a finer-grained level of understanding of 
syntactic computations in an effort to make the theories of linguists relatable to (and per-
haps commensurable with) domains outside of the language sciences. 
    27  Belleri (2016: 29) presents different, complimentary arguments that “it is not the case that 
sentences even generally fail to fully express our thoughts”, given “minimal contextual 
information,” countering the claims of Recanati (2004), Carston (1999), Travis (1996), and 
countless others. 
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cognitive processes, and to say that a particular expression can vary in its truth-
value is, on the one hand, to utter a platitude, but on the other it is to imply that 
constructs like time and personal taste somehow impinge upon the operations of 
syntax.28 Evans’s use of tense logic, for instance, reveals its shortcomings in 
representing (let alone explaining) the semantics of (12a), which it would 
incorrectly notate as (14) (similar to how the decompositional approaches to open 
class words like open noted in section 2 are inadequate): 
 
(14) (∀t) (‘It is three o’clock’ is truet ≡ it is three o’clock at t) 
  
Further, by placing time on an independent metaphysical plane from all 
other forms of context (while also exclusively discussing the concerns of ‘modal 
logicians’ and ‘tense logicians’, and not linguists), McIntosh (2014) is indirectly 
sidelining the importance of other contextual variables, which, as we have seen, 
are much closer to the content of a given linguistic construction than has typically 
been appreciated. Quite apart from these empirical considerations, from a purely 
naturalistic perspective the motivation behind invoking pragmatic operations 
and unarticulated constituents is a relatively peculiar one, failing to meet 
universally accepted standards of theoretical simplicity and empirical adequacy 
taken for granted in other domains of the cognitive and natural sciences. If an 
investigator of a higher-level science can explain some phenomenon by way of a 
lower-level account (a systems neuroscientist invoking neurochemical processes, 
for instance), then the need to construct further higher-level objects or processes 
becomes redundant.  
Relatedly, while philosophers of physics and philosophers of biology need 
to be well versed in physics and biology, it is somewhat peculiar that philosophy 
of language textbooks are remarkably light on linguistics. Discussions of syntax 
typically reduce to bullet points about how syntax is the study of ‘word order’ 
and the like. Empirical claims about language should be accompanied by a 
scientific understanding of linguistic structure, just as debates about physicalism 
and Hox genes need to be supported by an understanding of the relevant area of 
knowledge. More generally, there is a tendency in philosophical and pragmatic 
circles to ignore the fact that language has grammatical organization, and to 
sideline the implications of this for topics ranging from meaning to vagueness to 
intentionality. The ideological and structural barriers to innovation in this 
domain are substantial, and often overlooked.  
The pragmaticist’s desire to appeal to, for instance, essentialism and Atlas 
(1989, 2005) and Carston’s (2002) ‘underdeterminacy thesis’ may stem from a 
more general cognitive tendency to complete missing details, such as in the case 
of Kanizsa’s ‘incomplete’ triangle, which is not too distant from saying that 
“Mary has arrived” is really a particular manifestation of “Mary has arrived in 
London”. The evidence used to defend, for instance, the silent subject-argument 
of ‘win’ in control structures like “Mary wants to win the game”, with the argu-
ment co-referring with ‘Mary’, are entirely different from the justifications given 
                                                
    28  This perspective is in fact similar to J.L. Austin’s intuition that questions of truth arise at a 
different level from natural language expressions. 
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in the pragmatics literature for silent elements. The principles of syntactic com-
putation explain the semantic phenomena, and the hidden constituents (e.g. 
PRO) are not only defended on such grounds, but also crucially interact with 
other grammatical constructs like Case and c-command. The kind of rationale 
seen in discussions of pragmatic underdetermination, saturation and free enrich-
ment is similar to the one seen in the case of someone explaining that the reason 
why “John arrived at the park” really expresses the meaning “John arrived at the 
nice, sunny, green park” is because they happen to know (via a close friend) how 
much John loves parks which are nice, sunny, and green. Missing elements need 
to be independently grammatically licensed, not stipulated as a ‘general prag-
matic process’. Pragmaticists also often ‘over-generate’ hidden elements (Sennet 
2011), as in the case of the common claim that “Everyone went to London” or 
“Everyone screamed” really express the propositions that everyone in a given 
context went to London or screamed (Carston 2009: 7). But to claim that everyone 
went to London is certainly not to claim that “Everyone alive went to London”, 
and so there is no need to invoke ancillary pragmatic operations, since there is in 
fact no semantic mismatch between content and linguistic form to begin with. 
More generally, a tendency to interpret a given utterance in a particular way (e.g. 
interpreting “It’s three o’clock” as “It’s three o’clock at the time of utterance”) 
says nothing about the intrinsic content of that utterance. Likewise, a given 
speaker’s communicative intention to express “It’s three o’clock now” when 
uttering “It’s three o’clock” does not provide a basis from which to posit obliga-
torily present silent elements (contra Fodor & Lepore 2004: 10), any more than 
my communicative intention to express “I don’t know” when shrugging my right 
shoulder in a given context implies that there is some inherent, obligatory seman-
tic content to the act of shrugging one’s shoulder, which could mean any number 
of things.  
These observations also apply to supposedly unarticulated instruments. 
“He took the gun out and shot John” is often taken to include a hidden consti-
tuent ‘with the gun’ after ‘John’ (Korta & Perry 2008). But not only is it otiose to 
add the PP ‘with the gun’ when answering the question “What did he do with 
the gun?” by saying “He took the gun out and shot John with the gun”, but this 
statement is also false in situations in which John was shot with another 
instrument, unlike the original utterance in which ‘with the gun’ is absent. The 
two constructions yield different truth-values with distinct propositional force.It 
is also worth noting that many of the justifications for underarticulation and 
underdeterminacy, such as Neale’s (2007) Underarticulation Thesis, rest on an 
implicit adoption of semantic externalism, through which linguistic meaning is 
somehow ‘tied’ and ‘connected’ to mind-external physicalist objects and pro-
cesses, often discussed within the context of Twin Earth and Dry Earth scenarios, 
and driven and reproduced by an unspoken but powerful allegiance to what 
Sellars (1963: 6) called “the manifest image” of ordinary perceptual content, 
rather than the underlying conceptual representations and system of compu-
tations which sustain it (see Chomsky 2000, 2013; Lau & Deutsch 2014).29 Defend-
                                                
    29  A similar suspicion of externalism can be detected in many literary works, for instance in 
John Cowper Powys’s 1934 novel Weymouth Sands, in which the philosopher Richard Gaul 
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ing the existence of hidden location variables in utterances like “It’s raining”, 
Perry (1998: 9) reasons that the location “is a constituent, because, since rain 
occurs at a time in a place, there is no truth-evaluable proposition unless a place 
is supplied.” But this argument stands only if syntax (and presumably lexical 
content, too) is structured and directed by necessarily syntax-external processes. 
Rain is not the same thing as the complex concept RAIN, any more than a child’s 
(or, for that matter, an adult’s) conception of water the same thing as H2O (contra 
Belleri 2016: 36). Syntax supplies temporal and spatial associations in the struc-
ture “It’s raining” through tense and nominal reference, while what Hinzen 
(2015) calls the Here and Now of a speech act (its given time and location, which 
necessarily accompany any utterance) also saturate it, and so nothing is under-
articulated, and grammar requires no assistance from exotic pragmatic 
operations. 
As noted in section 1, grammar and content align in ways largely unrecog-
nized in the literature on pragmatics and human cognition more generally. 
Grammar-meaning alignment should be seen as the null hypothesis, with empi-
rical work required to justify deviation from it. Assuming this, we can propose 
the following guideline: 
 
(15) Syntax-Internal Precedence (SIP) 
 Invoke syntax-external processes, such as pragmatic procedures, only when 
the explanatory power of syntax-internal operations reaches its limit. 
 
To push the above argument further, the present evaluation of (12)–(14) 
leads to a rejection of pragmatic unarticulated constituents of the kind which can 
also be produced by merely observing the adicity of particular concepts, without 
even resorting to the level of analysis Phasal Eliminativism operates at. Indeed, 
instead of invoking unarticulated elements, an urgent and more difficult task 
faces the linguist and philosopher concerned with why (16) is a full sentence, if 
stabbed is a concept with a variable corresponding to the stabber: 
 
(16) Caesar was stabbed. 
 
Understanding the valences/adicities of lexicalized concepts requires no 
‘silent’ elements constructed by human pragmatic competence (e.g. “Caesar was 
stabbed [Op]”, with a silent operator standing for the stabber) or even individual 
differences amongst people of different tongues, but can be achieved through a 
deeper understanding of the individual set-theoretic operations and represen-
tations which host such properties, without the need to bring the grim human 
being into things. In a similar way that truth cannot purely be reduced to 
syntactic propositional structures (CPs), and can only be said to operate within 
                                                                                                                                 
walks among the “glaucous-leaved, crimson-stalked marsh-plants” in Lodmoor country 
park’s “dark stretches of gloomy peat-sold” with a young companion, Perdita Wane, and 
the “vague warmth of diffused well-being that it cast over him seemed to reveal with a cul-
minating vividness that all material objects were unreal compared with the mental activity 
in which they floated, like rocking driftwood on an intangible tide” (1999: 155; see Murphy 
2014b). 
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these constraints, so too can the differing number of arguments a verb takes 
(compare the dyadic slept to the highly polyadic—that is, ranging from dyadic to 
triadic to tetradic—put) be attributed to multiple factors. The adicities of lexical 
items is plainly one factor in the construction of their meaning. Another appears 
to be the effects of lexical items being instructions to build monadic concepts 
which may in turn have been introduced by other concepts with varied adicities. 
Since non-humans are capable of combining two distinct concepts (Murphy 
2015a), the term concept, when used within linguistics and philosophy, should 
therefore be understood as concepts which display a (yet to be fully determined) level 
of inter-modular assimilation. 
Given that thematic concepts are yielded by labeling, and the possibly 
human-unique nature of this operation, I would correspondingly like to shift the 
explanatory burden in accounts of linguistic interpretation not just to syntax, but 
to labeling. While there are a number of reasons to be suspicious of their 
lexicalist, word-internal definition of ‘label’ (according to which individual 
lexical items have a ‘relabeling’ capacity under certain conditions of movement), 
Cecchetto & Donati (2015: 31) are nevertheless right to note that “labels belong to 
the core part of grammar that cannot be dispensed with and cannot be relegated 
to the interface”. The above division in the role of the computational system and 
the interpretive systems also reflects the blind and free nature of Merge on the one 
hand (documented by Epstein et al. 2014), and the necessary optionality of the 
interpretive operations of pragmatics, such as lexical narrowing (where drink is 
interpreted as alcoholic drink), on the other.  
Syntax can also explain a number of entailment phenomena, if we assume, 
as noted above, that adjuncts are simply concatenated to a structure and do not 
reconfigure (i.e. re-label) the clause to which they are adjoined. “It’s three o’clock 
in London” entails “It’s three o’clock”, but “Every man in the building is tall” 
does not entail “Every man is tall”. This is due to the fact that in the former case 
the PP ‘in London’ is adjoined to the full structure, whereas in the latter case the 
PP ‘in the building’ is adjoined to the NP ‘man’ before quantification is fixed. 
Lexically, [NP man [PP in the building]] entails ‘man’, since a man who is in the 
building is still a man, but it does not entail that every man is tall since the PP is 
not adjoined to the QP ‘every man’. The reason why an utterance of “Every man 
is tall” in a given context can entail that every man in the building is tall is 
because, as discussed, lexical but not syntactic representations are sensitive to 
context. In addition, meaning has always been justifiably understood as a relation 
between concepts and one, not two, linguistic structures.30 Those claiming that 
hidden adjuncts and other material simply constitute the same meaning as the 
surface utterance therefore have to also provide reasons for abandoning this as-
sumption; no such contemporary argument has been presented. When Recanati 
(2004: 58) moves beyond lexical underdeterminacy and argues for the existence 
of ‘constructional’ (grammatical) underdeterminacy in the case of ‘red pen’, we 
can simply point to the trusty computational system and invoke labeling as the 
operation which ensures that this phrase can never denote a red object which 
                                                
    30  See also the contrast principle put forward in Clark (1988), under which speakers assume 
that two forms always differ in meaning. 
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happens to function as a pen (in which the adjective would label the phrase an 
AP), and can only denote a pen with the property of being red (an NP). Syntax 
consequently determines meaning, carving the path pragmatics must blindly 
follow.31  
Let us assume further that nouns, verbs and modifiers are instructions to 
build monadic concepts, a process achieved via set-formation/Conjoin. In con-
trast, labeling permits the creation of thematic concepts (Murphy 2015c), and can 
be appealed to in order to reduce the need for extra pragmatic processes. Labels 
can introduce dyadic concepts like INTERNAL(E,X), with the necessary information 
being filled by the monadic concepts fetched by lexical items. Adding to Pie-
troski’s (2012) argument that “lexicalization is a tool for creating concepts that 
abstract from certain formal distinctions exhibited by prior concepts”, the combi-
nability of human concepts may be generated by labeling, amounting to the kind 
of type-lifting operation proposed by numerous figures (Montague 1974; Kamp 
1975) yielding higher-order concepts (than purely monadic ones) able to be 
saturated, e.g. λY.λX.RED(X) & Y(X) can be saturated by CHAIR(X) to form RED(X) & 
CHAIR(X).  
Given this, the implications for the language sciences are clear. The linguist 
concerned with exploring topics ranging from ellipsis to co-predication should 
attempt to construct hypotheses based on SIP, invoking pragmatic processes only 
in an effort to explain how syntactically determined representations are ulti-
mately enriched. A principled account of syntactic computation can derive many 
of the truth-conditional effects discussed by pragmaticists, and there is no need 
to couch a description of such phenomena within theories of ‘free enrichment’ or 
‘underarticulation’, which are, ultimately, nothing more than elaborate methods 
of data coding, not explanation. 
 
3.2. Labeling Theory 
 
Before concluding, I would like to briefly discuss the actual labeling architecture 
invoked above, since instead of exclusively seeking semantic or pragmatic 
accounts of linguistic content, an understanding of syntax, following SIP, can also 
reveal the structure (or at least the legibility conditions) of CI. 
Though phrase structure building has traditionally been seen as being cate-
gorially anchored, Chomsky (2015) proposes that labeling can also be achieved 
through less obvious methods. He explores so-called <φ,φ> agreement, through 
which an {XP, YP} structure is labeled by symmetric φ-features. For instance, φ-
features shared by K/D and T can label a phrase in which KP has undergone 
movement due to Q-feature agreement with T: 
 
(17) {{K[φ], NP}, {T[φ]{… tKP …}}} 
 
As Epstein et al. (2015: 109) point out, structures like (18) also cannot be 
labeled and crash at CI, since XP and YP have no intersecting features, and what 
                                                
    31  Questions of semantic content hover in the background, and are related to and constrained 
by labeling, but naturally do not reduce to it. Epstein et al. (2014: 465) stress that labeling 
theory is silent about “how the conceptual-intentional systems use the information that, say, 
{H, XP} is an H-type thing” (where ‘H’ denotes the phrasal head/label). 
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would otherwise be the embedded TP remains unlabeled:  
 
(18)  * There is likely [[XP a man] [YP to arrive]]. 
 
But the agreement features (uninterpretable features, uFs, valued by Agree) 
on T in (17) would have to be visible at CI for the derivation to converge and sa-
tisfy Full Interpretation, which seemingly contradicts the uninterpretable (i.e. un-
detectable at CI) status of uFs in the context of T, since there can be no meaning-
ful Person, Gender, and Number specifications with regards to Tense. As a way 
of remedying this, suppose that Transfer to CI (either as a property of Transfer or 
an interpretive condition) can select which copied feature-bundles are inter-
preted in the case of featurally symmetric {XP, YP} structures, perhaps through a 
form of semantically driven minimal head detection, as in Narita (2014), or a mo-
dification to the labeling algorithm, as in Adger (2013), allowing the copied (via 
Agree) φ-features on T to remain invisible and K’s feature-bundle to be assigned 
interpretation. This would effectively turn the above structure into a <φ,φ> 
object at CI, with the strikethrough denoting selective uninterpretability, and we 
can assume that agreement features are visible for labeling. This symmetry-
breaking perspective on labeling, yielded by cyclic transfer, also speaks to the 
present anti-lexicalism, since labeling is shown to be independent of the influence 
of lexical categories.32 
Relatedly, it is worth briefly returning to the similarity discussed above 
between certain syntactic and semantic operations, since this might shed further 
light on syntax–CI interactions and disparities. Consider Function Application 
and theories of type-shifting, which appear (broadly) syntactic since they concern 
forms of mental computation. Though many other semantic operations (such as 
Pietroski’s Conjoin) may simply be syntax ‘in disguise’, these operations notably 
violate principles of minimal computation like the No-Tampering Condition 
(NTC) and Inclusiveness Condition (IC), and so may have been the result of the 
kind of Darwinian modification by descent impacting conceptual representations 
(Hurford 2007; Carey 2009), unlike the ‘perfect’ system of narrow syntax with its 
operations of cyclic transfer and labeling by minimal search, which likely arose 
through a less gradual evolutionary process, perhaps of the Thompsonian kind 
as discussed in the evo-devo literature (see Hinzen 2006; Murphy 2015a).33 Such 
                                                
    32  It also seems to me incorrect to claim, as is standardly done (e.g. in Epstein et al. 2014, 2015), 
that Collins (2002) attempted to eliminate labels from the grammar. Despite the title of his 
article, Collins rather worked towards changing traditionally labeled nodes to a lexically 
defined set of prominence relations. 
    33  Concerns over simplicity and elegance in the study of language trace back at least to Leon-
ard & Goodman’s (1940: 51) ‘considerations of economy’ in their logical-epistemic work, 
and to Quine & Goodman’s (1940: 109) distinction between ‘real and apparent economy’, i.e. 
theory-internal elegance vs. notational simplicity. It was understood that simplicity of theo-
ry is tantamount to explanatory depth. See Larson (2015) and Narita (2014) for discussions 
of computational efficiency and attempts to refine this amorphous notion, and Boeckx (2014: 
87) for a critical examination of the standard claim that an increase in phase boundaries 
necessarily leads to greater computational complexity, which is rejected in favor of a novel 
phase model which suggests that if the phase head α labels the singleton set β it is an 
‘intransitive’ phase, and if δ labels the two-member set {γ,α} it is a ‘transitive’ phase; see 
Murphy (2015d) for discussion and also Boeckx (2012) for the original proposal. 
Elliot Murphy 
 
42 
‘semantic’ CI operations involve mapping from hierarchical sentential structures 
to truth-values and sets of functions, violating IC and NTC. This topic has not 
been addressed to my knowledge in the semantics or wider cognitive science lite-
rature, but further interdisciplinary collaboration would achieve a richer analysis 
of both the core computational system and more peripheral semantic conditions 
and pragmatic operations, perhaps alleviating Tomalin’s (2006: 3) concern, in his 
history of generative grammar and its relation to the formal sciences, that there 
exist “many areas of research that are not understood with sufficient precision to 
permit an axiomatic-deductive analysis”.34 The mode of grammar which charac-
terizes certain aspects of human thought, based on a phasal architecture, has the 
potential to reveal the structure, relations, and development of semantic repre-
sentations; one of the motivations behind the following claim from Ott (2009: 
360): “The particular phases we find in human syntax are thus not a matter of 
necessity; if the C-I system were structured differently, different structures would 
be ‘picked out’.” 
Notice also that at this point the topics of anti-lexicalism, pragmatic com-
petence and biolinguistics make a certain amount of hitherto unnoticed contact. If 
linguistic structures can amount to φ-labeled, propositionally complete, and cyc-
lically transferred conceptual representations which are only optionally enriched 
through more general cognitive and pragmatic processes, then the task of achiev-
ing a suitable level of granularity from which to meet the demands of biological 
adequacy not only becomes much clearer, but it also carries with it a higher level 
of falsifiability, given a developing understanding of the neural dynamics of 
linguistic computation (Bastiaansen & Hagoort 2015; Murphy 2015e, 2016) and 
cartographic advances in mapping the brain regions implicated in particular 
semantic representations (Moseley & Pulvermüller 2014). This is a clear advan-
tage over less specific biolinguistic hypotheses, as Lasnik & Kupin (1977) already 
noted in their discussion of reduced phrase markers and restrictive syntactic 
theories. In addition, Moseley & Pulvermüller’s (2014) study found that topo-
graphical differences in brain activation in response to a variety of noun and verb 
types were modulated by semantics, and not lexical category. Combined with the 
insight that phrases can be labeled and stored in short-term memory (during 
online structure-building) as objects labeled by non-lexical features (e.g. [φ … α … 
[γ … β …]]), this consequently broadens the available options for empirically 
studying language at the implementational level, with those concerned with, for 
instance, the neural correlates of phrasal comprehension no longer being limited 
to searching for signs of NP or VP interpretation. 
As this section has demonstrated, there is no shortage of constructive ways 
to explore linguistic computation and the structure of conceptual representations; 
some well-established, others newly emerging. But the search for unarticulated 
                                                
    34  Even in debates at the syntax–semantics interface, it is often left unaddressed which 
structures, operations and features qualify as being narrowly syntactic, and which are post-
syntactic. This is indirectly intensified by much of the cartographic literature. 
EvaluativeMoodP, for instance, is likely not a syntactic primitive, rather arising as the output 
of syntax-CI Transfer operations. In addition, due to the ‘syntacticocentric’ (to use Jacken-
doff’s term) perspective on CI interpretation adopted here, perhaps the ‘interpretive’ 
function of formal semantics, ⟦ ⟧, should be re-analyzed as being concerned with labels. 
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constituents via pragmatic processes of free enrichment is not one of them. As the 
bridges between linguistic sub-disciplines become stronger, and the prospects for 
wider collaboration with the life sciences grow, it should by now be particularly 
clear that multidisciplinary perspectives, goals and agendas should be pursued. 
Syntax is not enough, semantics and pragmatics are not enough, mathematics 
and philosophy are not enough, anthropology and brain dynamics are not 
enough. Nothing short of everything will really suffice. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The ongoing search in the field of pragmatics for unarticulated, missing elements 
has derailed a generation of inquiry into the interpretive systems, even if certain 
properties of these systems, such as relevance-seeking, have been exposed. 
Following SIP, a return to the original concerns of generative grammar centered 
on the computational system and how it interfaces with the external systems is 
now needed. As I hope to have shown, reference is achieved through gramma-
tical, not lexical, mechanisms, while syntactic structures are not underspecified 
for semantic content, as is often claimed by pragmaticists. An understanding of 
what syntax can and cannot do is required before post-syntactic CI structures 
and pragmatic mechanisms can be appealed to. By adopting Phasal Elimina-
tivism and viewing word meanings as a combination of pragmatically enriched 
concepts and pLEX representations, there is consequently no underdeterminacy, 
no pragmatic compositionality, no signifier-signified semantics, no Twin Earth 
paradox, no productive polysemy, no essentialism, no problems of reference or 
eternal sentences. There is only the bi-phasal syntactic and pragmatic compu-
tational procedure and its various operations: set-formation, labeling, cyclic 
transfer, saturation, relevance-seeking, and so on. It remains to be seen how far 
the pragmatic systems and semantic content can be reduced either to operations 
of the computational system or the structure of CI. 
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